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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Percy William Travillion (“Travillion”), is 
appealing a decision of the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania denying relief sought 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We must address two issues 
3 
 
certified for appeal: whether trial counsel was ineffective for 
(1) failing properly to cross-examine a witness and (2) failing 
to file a pre-trial motion challenging whether the conspiracies 
charged in Counts Nine and Thirteen of the Indictment 
violated the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against double 
jeopardy. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
decision of the District Court.  
I. Facts 
 Travillion was indicted by a grand jury in 2004 on 
three counts related to a large drug trade in the greater 
Pittsburgh area, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and § 
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii).
1
 At trial, Travillion raised the 
                                              
1
 In total the Indictment contained 19 counts. Travillion was 
indicted on Counts Nine, Ten, and Thirteen. 
 
Count Nine: From on or about November 20, 
2002, and continuing thereafter to on or about 
February 8, 2003, in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, the defendants . . . did 
knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully 
conspire with one another and with persons 
both known and unknown . . . to distribute and 
possess with the intent to distribute fifty (50) 
grams or more of . . . cocaine base, in the form 
commonly known as crack. 
 
Count Ten: On or about December 16, 2002 . . . 
Percy William Travillion, did knowingly, 
intentionally, and unlawfully possess with the 
intent to distribute fifty (50) grams or more . . . 
4 
 
defenses that he was not a member of either conspiracy in 
Counts Nine and Thirteen, and also that the drug at issue in 
the Count Ten possession charge was heroin, not crack.
2
 The 
United States called five witnesses, including Michael Good, 
the main supplier of drugs to Travillion.
3
 Key to the 
presentation of evidence was a series of phone call wiretaps, 
including a call between Good and Travillion on December 
16, 2002. Respecting this call, Good testified he was checking 
whether or not Travillion needed drugs before Good left town 
for a couple of days, and that what was being discussed was 
five ounces of crack, totaling $4,500.
4
 Travillion’s attorney 
                                                                                                     
of cocaine base, in the form commonly known 
as crack. 
 
Count Thirteen: From on or about November 
20, 2002, and continuing thereafter to on or 
about February 8, 2003, in the Western District 
of Pennsylvania, the defendants . . . did 
knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully 
conspire with one another and with persons 
unknown to the grand jury, to distribute and 
possess with the intent to distribute five 
hundred (500) grams or more of . . . cocaine. 
 
(Appellee Br. at 20-21; see also App. vol. II at 68, 71-72.)  
2
 We will refer to cocaine base in the form sold by Travillion 
as “crack” throughout the Opinion.  
3
 Good testified the quantities of crack sold to Travillion 
increased during the period between 2002 and 2003, and 
eventually he began fronting the drugs to Travillion, in the 
expectation he would be paid after Travillion made sales.  
4
 Good testified he sold crack to Travillion at $900 per ounce.  
5 
 
cross-examined Good on his and Travillion’s addiction 
histories, the inability of Good to obtain crack around 
December 2002, Good’s cooperation with the Government 
for a reduced sentence, and Travillion’s role in the larger 
drug-dealing organization. 
 
 Travillion took the stand in his own defense, 
countering Good’s testimony and claiming what was being 
discussed in the December 16 phone call was not crack but 
rather was nine bundles of heroin, with a value of only $450.
5
 
                                              
5
 The relevant transcript portions of the December 16 phone 
call are reproduced below. 
 
[Good]: I was trying to get in touch with you to 
see if you’re all right [sic] before I go out of 
town. 
[Travillion]: Was you cutting out today? 
. . . . 
[Travillion]: Cause I still had a couple of them 
things left. 
[Good]: I’m calling to make sure you’re cool, 
because I’m not going to be back till Thursday. 
. . . . 
[Travillion]: That should hold me till then. 
[Good]: You’ll be alright? 
[Travillion]: Yeah, yeah yep . . . . I’m going to 
try to grab one more then off you, can I do that? 
That way I’ll have more then . . . 
[Good]: What are you turning in? Yeah, what 
you turning in? 
[Travillion]: Just grab one more . . . . I’m going 
to turn in probably like two. 
6 
 
On cross-examination, the Government challenged Travillion 
on the weight and type of drugs he testified to, because heroin 
was not what he typically sold nor was the amount the 
quantity of any drug he typically purchased. Travillion was 
convicted by a jury on all three counts, and sentenced to 188 
months’ imprisonment.6 On appeal, this Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the District Court.
7
 See United States v. 
Travillion, 321 F. App’x 156, 159 (3d Cir. 2009). 
                                                                                                     
[Good]: Cause you uh, we have forty-five cause 
you had five. 
[Travillion]: Right. 
. . . . 
[Good]: You turn in then, you gonna turn in two 
then make it back at five. 
[Travillion]: Right.  
 
(App. vol. VI at 1104-05.) 
6
 Travillion received concurrent sentences of 188 months’ 
imprisonment and concurrent five-year terms of supervised 
release on Counts Nine, Ten, and Thirteen. This was at the 
bottom end of the United States Sentencing Guidelines range 
of 188 to 235 months, calculated from a total offense level of 
34, including a two-level enhancement for obstructing justice 
under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and a criminal history category of 
III. He also had to pay a $100 special assessment on each 
count.  
7
 On direct appeal, Travillion alleged (1) the evidence was 
insufficient, (2) the jury instruction was improper, (3) there 
were procedural errors in enhancing his total offense level for 
obstruction of justice and for considering a state offense in 
the calculations, and (4) that Congress did not have the power 
7 
 
  
 Travillion then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his 
sentence by adjusting the advisory Guidelines down two 
levels.
8
 This motion alleged four reasons for collateral relief 
under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: 
 
(1) Trial Counsel failed to effectively 
investigate and cross-examine Government 
witnesses, (2) Trial Counsel failed to effectively 
investigate facts made known to him by 
Petitioner constituting Petitioner’s only realistic 
defense, (3) Trial Counsel failed to adequately 
advise Petitioner on the risk in his testifying on 
his own behalf, and (4) Trial Counsel failed to 
adequately object to Petitioner’s conviction on 
two separate counts that comprised the same 
conspiracy, thus exposing Petitioner to double 
jeopardy.  
United States v. Travillion, 2012 WL 5354530, at *2 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 29, 2012) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). The District Court denied the motion, noting that 
while counsel’s performance may have been deficient on 
certain issues, Travillion was not prejudiced, as the evidence 
presented against him was “overwhelming.” Id. at *6. This 
appeal followed. 
                                                                                                     
to enact the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act under 
the Commerce Clause. Travillion, 321 F. App’x at 158-59. 
8
 This claim also sought reduction of the obstruction of justice 
enhancement mentioned above. See supra note 6.  
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 Travillion now argues counsel’s performance was 
ineffective because he failed to impeach Good with his own 
prior testimony in a contemporaneous and factually similar 
case, titled by the parties as the “Ferguson Retrial.”9 See 
United States v. Ferguson, 394 F. App’x 873, 888 (3d Cir. 
2010) (affirming retrial decision by the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania). Travillion 
also contends that counsel failed to object on double jeopardy 
grounds to the indictment charging two separate conspiracies 
in Counts Nine and Thirteen, which caused him to be twice 
punished with a $100 special assessment and an extra 
concurrent term of supervised release for a single conspiracy. 
Travillion now seeks an order vacating and remanding for a 
new trial, or in the alternative, remanding for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
 
II. Standard of Review
10
 
 A. Section 2255 Motion 
 As a collateral challenge, a motion pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 is reviewed much less favorably than a direct 
appeal of the sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 
                                              
9
 During the Ferguson Retrial, Good testified to his prior 
mental health issues and showed confusion when detailing 
which drugs he sold to which dealers. (Appellant Br. at 23 
(citing App. vol. VII at 1569-72, 1665).) 
10
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Travillion’s claims 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We now 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253, as a 
final order by the District Court. 
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U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). Indeed, relief under § 2255 is 
available only when “the claimed error of law was ‘a 
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 
miscarriage of justice,’ and . . . ‘present[s] exceptional 
circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the 
writ . . . is apparent.’” Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 
346 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 
(1962)). While issues resolved in a prior direct appeal will not 
be reviewed again by way of a § 2255 motion,
11
 United States 
v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993), they may, 
however, be used to support a claim for ineffectiveness. See 
Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(per curiam) (noting claims of error under the Sentencing 
Guidelines are generally not cognizable on collateral review 
unless to support an ineffectiveness claim). 
  
 In a § 2255 review, we usually have the advantage of a 
§ 2255 opinion from the District Judge who presided over the 
original trial. Accordingly, the District Judge is not limited to 
a cold written record, but is uniquely familiar with the overall 
circumstances of the original case. “[A] motion under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 is entered on the docket of the original 
criminal case and is typically referred to the judge who 
originally presided over the challenged proceedings . . . .” 
Wall v. Kholi, —U.S.—, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1289 (2011). 
Although a § 2255 motion is sometimes loosely referred to as 
a habeas corpus motion, unlike a § 2254 habeas petition, 
which usually concerns cases that arose in state court, a § 
2255 challenge is a post-trial motion to vacate, set aside or 
                                              
11
 In addition, issues which should have been raised on direct 
appeal may not be raised with a § 2255 motion. See DeRewal, 
10 F.3d at 105 n.4. 
10 
 
correct a sentence imposed in federal court. Section 2255 is a 
corrective action, United States v. Hock, 275 F.2d 726, 727 
(3d Cir. 1960) (per curiam), and unlike “a § 2254 petition[, 
which] is a separate civil action, . . . a § 2255 motion is a 
further step in the criminal process,” United States v. Nahodil, 
36 F.3d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1994); see also United States v. 
Thomas, 713 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that 
Section 2255 “creates a statutory remedy consisting of a 
motion before the court where a movant was convicted” 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in 
original)). 
 
 B. Reviewing Standard 
 “In a [§ 2255] proceeding, we exercise plenary review 
of the district court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly 
erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings.” Lambert v. 
Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 1997). The standard of 
review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was set 
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 
prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must 
show 
  
[first,] that counsel’s performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, 
the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
a trial whose result is reliable. 
11 
 
466 U.S. at 687. Thus, to prove a valid claim, Travillion must 
show both deficiency and prejudice. Id. 
  
 As the Supreme Court has stated, “the Constitution 
guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a 
competent attorney. It does not insure that defense counsel 
will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional 
claim.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982). On review, 
we “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.” Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “In essence, 
‘the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness’ meaning 
‘reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” Id. 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Regarding the interplay 
between Strickland and § 2255, if Travillion shows both 
elements of Strickland, he satisfies the requirements of § 
2255. See United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Phila., Inc., 612 
F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[P]ersons . . . can attack a 
conviction for fundamental defects, such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”). 
  
III. Discussion 
 We now turn to the two certified ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims before us. First, Travillion claims that 
counsel was ineffective because he “failed to cross-examine . 
. . Michael Good, on matters that would have undermined 
Good’s credibility and supported Travillion’s defense, 
particularly on the crack possession charge, . . . [from] readily 
available transcripts of Good’s testimony in [the Ferguson 
Retrial].” (Appellant Br. at 19.) Second, Travillion avers that 
12 
 
“counsel’s failure to challenge the [conspiracy] indictment[s] 
on double jeopardy grounds also constituted deficient 
performance . . . [where] [t]he circumstances of the case 
amply satisfied the nominal burden required to . . . challenge 
at the pretrial stage.” (Id.) Travillion contends both failures of 
counsel prejudiced the outcome of his trial because they 
resulted in multiple convictions and increased sentences. 
  
 We begin, as above, with the steps outlined in 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. We may address the prejudice 
prong first “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.” Id. at 
697. We will address both claims in turn, undertaking plenary 
review, and reminding ourselves that both deficiency and 
prejudice must be proven to have a valid claim for relief. Id. 
at 687. 
  
 A. Failure to Adequately Cross-Examine 
 Travillion avers that trial counsel’s performance was 
deficient for failing to obtain the prior testimony and cross-
examine Michael Good with contradictory and impeachment 
evidence from the Ferguson Retrial, and these errors 
significantly prejudiced the outcome of the trial. 
  
  1. Prejudice 
 In determining prejudice, “a court hearing an 
ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the 
evidence before the judge or jury.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695. Travillion claims counsel prejudiced his defense, and 
that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
13 
 
been different.” Id. at 694. This alleged prejudice concerns 
the failure of trial counsel to utilize statements made by Good 
at the Ferguson Retrial to impeach his statement that he sold 
Travillion crack and failing to bring up Good’s prior 
testimony on his mental health issues.
12
 For example, during 
the Ferguson Retrial, Good testified he could not remember 
the terminology he used for drugs with buyers and which 
drug he sold to another dealer in a prior deal. (See Appellant 
Br. at 29 (citing App. vol. VII at 1752).) 
 
[Good:] I served them their drugs that day, I 
know that. I remember that. 
                                              
12
 These issues included schizophrenia, for which Good 
collected Social Security disability benefits. Good testified at 
the Ferguson Retrial, stating:  
 
[Attorney:] During the interview, did the 
probation officer ask you questions about 
mental health problems that you’ve had? 
[Good:] Yes. 
[Attorney:] Did you tell the probation officer 
you had had mental health problems? 
[Good:] Yes . . . .  
[Attorney:] Mr. Dietz showed you your 
presentence report and questions were asked 
about  . . . what you were diagnosed with, and at 
one point you were asked whether you were a 
life-long schizophrenic, and that was corrected 
to paranoid schizophrenic related to drug use. 
 
(App. vol. VII at 1860-61.)  
14 
 
[Attorney:] When you say you served them 
their drugs, what are you referring to? 
[Good:] Heroin, cocaine. 
[Attorney:] Do you recall which one as you sit 
there? 
[Good:] No. I don’t recall which that he got that 
day. 
(App. vol. VII at 1572.) Travillion argues Good’s inability to 
remember the type of drug sold undermines his testimony that 
Travillion purchased crack on December 16, rather than 
heroin, as Travillion alleges. This forms the basis of 
Travillion’s assertion that Good’s confusion, along with his 
testimony in the Ferguson Retrial to occasionally selling 
small quantities (or “bundles”) of heroin,13 would have 
created reasonable doubt that the December 16 phone 
conversation referenced crack. Travillion argues that there is 
a reasonable probability that, had counsel more aggressively 
                                              
13
 A “bundle” is “ten stamped bags wrapped together” and 
five bundles is the equivalent of one brick. (App. vol. III at 
315-16.) Good typically sold bricks, but testified to selling 
these small quantities on occasion. Travillion’s argument was 
that at times Good sold small quantities and that he did so on 
this occasion.  
 
[Attorney:] Would you sell [heroin] in less than 
[brick size]? Would you ever sell bundles to 
anybody you know? 
[Good:] Yeah. I didn’t like that neither, but I 
did it sometimes.  
 
(App. vol. VII at 1813.)  
15 
 
cross-examined Good, the jury would have acquitted or 
deadlocked on the crack possession charge. This, in turn, 
would have altered Travillion’s sentence in two ways: first, 
by exposing him to one less concurrent term of supervised 
release and one less $100 special assessment; and second, by 
precluding the District Court’s assessment of a two-level 
upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, based on its 
conclusion that Travillion perjured himself when he testified 
that the drug at issue was heroin, not crack.
14
 (See Appellant 
Br. at 36-37.)   
                                              
14
 At trial, Travillion offered as a defense, elicited through his 
own testimony, that the December 16 phone call was 
referring to heroin. 
 
[Attorney:] Mr. Travillion, . . . you say, cause I 
still had a couple of things left. 
. . . .  
What are you referring to? 
[Travillion:]  I am referring to bundles of 
heroin. 
. . . . 
[Attorney:] Is it fair to say that at some point 
prior to December 16, 2002, you and Michael 
Good hooked up and did a heroin transaction? 
[Travillion:] Yes. 
. . . . 
[Attorney:] The price was $90.00 a bundle? 
[Travillion:] Right. 
. . . .  
[Attorney:] And you had five bundles? 
[Travillion:] Yes. 
16 
 
  The District Court, in denying relief, held the 
“Petitioner’s narrow focus on the minutiae of counsel’s cross-
examination is misguided.” 15  Travillion, 2012 WL 5354530, 
at *7. As the District Court determined, “[e]ven if counsel’s 
actions were deficient, there can be no prejudice because the 
evidence was otherwise overwhelming.”16 Id. at *6. This 
conclusion was based on “the totality of the circumstances” of 
trial evidence. The District Court cited “Good[‘s] open[] 
admi[ssion] that he was serving a fifteen-year sentence for 
drug trafficking crimes” as well as “incriminating wiretap 
evidence and [the] testimony of other witnesses against the 
                                                                                                     
[Attorney:] So, and how much did Michael 
Good charge you for those five bundles? 
[Travillion:] He charged me $450.00 . . . .  
 
(App. vol. V at 813-17.) 
15
 As noted, the same District Judge presided over the 
Ferguson Retrial as well, and heard the testimony now raised 
by Travillion as necessary for impeachment. While not 
dispositive, this same District Judge, after observing the 
conduct of trial counsel and the evidence presented, found no 
evidence of deficiency.  
16
 The District Court disposed of this claim under the 
prejudice prong, but also found no merit to the claim counsel 
was deficient. Id. (“Even if the court were to conclude that 
petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel’s actions, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that his counsel’s actions 
were professionally deficient in the way the petitioner 
alleges.”). 
17 
 
petitioner, including Sherri Hunter, Keeley Sowell, and 
Special Agent Jimenez.”17 Id. at *7.   
 Like the District Court, we also do not find trial 
counsel’s actions to have prejudiced Travillion. The right to a 
fair trial does not translate into the right to a perfect trial. See 
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Bradshaw, 726 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 
1984); see also United States v. Wilensky, 757 F.2d 594, 599 
(3d Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court has stated “[v]igorous 
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional 
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 596 (1993). 
  
 It is true that Circuit courts, including ours, have found 
counsel deficient for failing to cross-examine a witness with 
prior inconsistent statements, see, e.g., Berryman v. Morton, 
100 F.3d 1089, 1098 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting the failure to 
cross-examine using inconsistent statements from a prior trial 
to be deficient); Nixon v. Newsome, 888 F.2d 112, 115 (11th 
                                              
17
 At trial, Special Agent Jimenez of the Drug Enforcement 
Agency testified his understanding of the December 16 phone 
call to be “Good . . . was telling Mr. Travillion that he owed 
him $4,500.00 because he had given him five ounces of 
crack.” (App. vol. III at 373 (emphasis added).) Keeley 
Sowell, a user and dealer with Good, also testified she saw 
Good sell crack to Travillion. Finally, another dealer in 
Good’s network, Sherri Hunter, testified that in a call on the 
same day, she and Good discussed whether or not she had 
enough crack before he went away, similar to Good and 
Travillion’s conversation.  
 
18 
 
Cir. 1989) (determining deficiency by trial counsel for failing 
to confront the witness with evidence available in the 
transcript), however, this is not ultimately decisive under the 
prejudice prong. 
  
 Nevertheless, the collective evidence presented by the 
Government and the evidence elicited by trial counsel in his 
cross-examination of Good shows Travillion was not 
prejudiced, as the outcome of the trial would not have been 
different. Counsel’s strategies, as expressed in his closing 
argument, were to attack the credibility of Good as a witness, 
call into question his recollection of what drug he sold to 
Travillion, and establish a two-fold defense that: (1) 
Travillion was not a co-conspirator with Good, and (2) 
Travillion possessed heroin, not crack. Counsel stated: 
  
 [I]f you listen to the conversations, the 
words, there is no question that Mr. Travillion 
possessed heroin on that day with the intent to 
distribute it to someone else . . . . What we are 
arguing is the drug. 
. . . .  
 Police say anything about the 12-16-02 
of substance? No . . . . Keeley say anything 
about that? No. Sherri Hunter? No. Lamont 
Washington? No. No physical evidence. Wasn’t 
arrested with any stuff. No drugs seized. No 
drugs found. No statement. No surveillance, 
whether it just be eyeball from police officers or 
videotape. Nothing. 
 It boils down to, folks, to Michael Good.  
. . . .  
19 
 
 I am going to argue to you that the facts 
and circumstances are going to demonstrate to 
you that it was heroin, not coke. 
. . . .  
 Before we get to that, central to our 
theme, the government’s theme to get a 
conviction on that, you guys need to believe 
Michael Good . . . . No doubt about it, did 
Michael Good present himself to you as 
someone who has a firm grasp of the facts[?] 
Long drug history. 
 And then we are being asked questions 
about an event four years ago. Imagine yourself 
without drug history, and fried brain cells, being 
asked what happened four years ago. It would 
be very, very difficult.  
(App. vol. V at 1034-35.) Counsel was able to employ this 
strategy effectively through his cross-examination of Good, 
during which he elicited testimony of Good’s addictions,18 his 
                                              
18
  
[Attorney:] Sir, you told this jury about your 
addiction history. One addiction was to heroin, 
right? 
[Good:] Yes. 
[Attorney:] Another addition was to cocaine? 
[Good:] Yes. 
. . . . 
[Attorney:] And you were addicted to crack 
cocaine? 
[Good:] Yes.  
 
(App. vol. IV at 585.) 
20 
 
lack of memory of specific events,
19
 and his exchange of 
testimony for a reduced sentence.
20
  
 Travillion testified and claimed instead the drug 
discussed on December 16th was heroin. On cross, however, 
Travillion undermined his own testimony by admitting the 
conversation was the first ever dealing of heroin between the 
two.
21
 Further, Travillion also admitted that Good typically 
                                              
19
 Counsel also addressed Good’s inability to recall his 
dealings without the aid of telephone calls as evidence. 
 
[Attorney:] Not referencing the tape-
recordings[,] [a]s you sit here today, are you 
able to give us specific date[s], specific amounts 
of drug deals that you had with Percy 
Travillion? 
[Good:] No. 
 
(Id. at 637.)  
20
 An example of this line of questioning is as follows: 
 
[Attorney:] Sir, your sentence was fifteen years, 
ten months, do I have that right? 
[Good:] Yes. 
[Attorney:] And your testimony here is 
designed so you may very well get a reduction 
in that sentence? 
[Good:] Yes.  
 
(Id. at 638.) 
21 
This evidence is relevant to the outcome of the trial because 
it helps determine that it would be unlikely the coded 
language and quoted prices during the December 16 call 
21 
 
sold in large quantities, much larger than what Travillion 
claims was being discussed in the call. 
  
Finally, it must further be noted that the District 
Court’s jury charge informed the jury regarding Good that  
 
[t]he testimony of an alleged accomplice, 
someone who said he or she participated in the 
commission of a crime, must be examined and 
weighed by the jury with greater care . . . . 
 Michael Good . . . may be considered to 
be [an] alleged accomplice[] in this case or 
related cases.  
. . . .  
 The jury must determine whether the 
testimony of the accomplices has been affected 
by their self-interest or by their own agreements 
with the government . . . . You should never 
convict a defendant solely upon the 
unsupported testimony of an accomplice unless 
you believe the testimony beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(App. vol. V at 975-75 (emphasis added).) This charge further 
protected Travillion by instructing the jury to heavily 
scrutinize Good’s testimony as a key witness for the 
Government.
22
 
                                                                                                     
would have occurred for heroin, if the two never dealt it in the 
past.  
22
 Trial Counsel did not object to this charge in the pretrial 
proceedings.  
22 
 
 
 Nothing in the evidence presented shows that 
counsel’s errors in his cross-examination of Good were so 
serious, in light of all the evidence and jury instruction, to 
deprive the defendant of a trial whose result is reliable. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The totality of the evidence 
presented, and jury instruction concerning the reliability of 
Good’s testimony, created a fair trial in which Travillion was 
found guilty. Thus, we believe trial counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to cross-examine Good with evidence 
available from the Ferguson Retrial because the outcome of 
the trial was not prejudiced by counsel’s actions.  
  
  2. Deficiency of Counsel’s Performance23 
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  We note that we must assume from Travillion’s pro se 
assertion made in his § 2255 motion and the collective record 
that counsel failed to obtain and investigate the transcripts 
from the Ferguson Retrial. (Appellant Br. at 22 (“Travillion 
asserted in his § 2255 motion that his trial counsel failed even 
to obtain the transcripts and other relevant records from the 
prior trial.”).) In a pro se § 2255 petition, as here, we must 
accept “as true the allegations of the petitioner, unless they 
are clearly frivolous.” Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 
184 (3d Cir. 1978). More importantly, the “failure to 
investigate a critical source of potentially exculpatory 
evidence may present a case of constitutionally defective 
representation.” United States v. Baynes, 622 F.2d 66, 69 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
 Assuming Travillion’s allegation to be true, the 
“failure to conduct any pretrial investigation generally 
constitutes a clear instance of ineffectiveness.” United States 
23 
 
 Having found trial counsel’s representation not to be 
prejudicial to Travillion, we need not address the deficiency 
prong, as both deficiency and prejudice must be proven to 
support a valid claim for relief for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “[T]here is no 
reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . 
even to address both components of the inquiry if the 
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Marshall v. 
Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 86-87 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
 B. Double Jeopardy
24
   
                                                                                                     
v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989). “While counsel is 
entitled to substantial deference with respect to strategic 
judgment, an attorney must investigate a case, when he has 
cause to do so, in order to provide minimally competent 
professional representation.” United States v. Kauffman, 109 
F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir. 1997). This per se deficiency, 
however, is not dispositive, as we have found Travillion was 
not prejudiced by the actions of trial counsel.   
24
 A double jeopardy claim was never raised by Travillion 
during the course of his trial or original appeal, and thus 
would be waived. However, now the claim that is being put 
forth by Travillion is “not . . . an actual double jeopardy claim 
. . . but rather . . . to vacate or correct his sentence because of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise a double 
jeopardy claim.” Travillion, 2012 WL 5354530, at *13 n.15 
(emphasis in original). The District Court describes correctly 
why this claim has not been waived for failing to raise the 
issue of double jeopardy during the original trial: “[i]t is 
manifest that a claim of double jeopardy is an affirmative 
24 
 
 Travillion alternatively argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a pre-trial motion challenging the 
indictments charging Travillion with two conspiracies as 
violative of double jeopardy.
25
 Even though he received 
concurrent jail sentences on each count, Travillion maintains 
he had to face an additional concurrent term of supervised 
release and pay an extra $100 special assessment on the 
second conspiracy conviction.
26
 Again, we undertake plenary 
review under the two-prong Strickland test for deficiency and 
                                                                                                     
defense which must be raised properly [i.e., before trial] or 
may be deemed waived.” Id. (quoting United States v. Young¸ 
503 F.2d 1072, 1074 (3d Cir. 1974) (alteration in original)). 
The District Court further states, “[we] need [not] reach an 
ultimate conclusion about whether a claim of double jeopardy 
would have been sustained. The court must follow the 
Strickland analysis in determining whether counsel’s 
assistance was deficient and whether petitioner was 
prejudiced by this deficiency.” Id. 
25
 Count Nine charged Travillion with conspiracy to distribute 
crack cocaine, and Count Thirteen with conspiracy to 
distribute powder cocaine.  
26
 We have determined that Travillion was not prejudiced 
with regard to his claim of inadequate cross-examination and 
this ends his contention that he improperly received a 
sentencing adjustment for obstructing justice. With regard to 
the double jeopardy claim, there remains an issue as to 
whether or not a $100 special assessment and additional 
concurrent term of supervised release, standing alone, are 
sufficiently prejudicial to support a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255. Since we resolve the double jeopardy claim on the 
merits, we need not reach this issue. See Fields v. United 
States, 201 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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prejudice. For this analysis we will begin by determining 
whether Travillion was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to 
challenge the indictment prior to trial. 
  
 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution guarantees that no person 
shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Double 
Jeopardy Clause “prohibits [the government] from splitting 
one conspiracy into several prosecutions.” United States v. 
Becker, 892 F.2d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 1989). The key is whether 
the multiple crimes charged were the same “in law and in 
fact.” United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 881, 887 (3d Cir. 
1990) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This 
Circuit employs a “totality of the circumstances” test when 
determining whether a pretrial evidentiary hearing is 
necessary to determine if an indictment is invalid under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Liotard, 817 
F.2d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir. 1987). 
  
 “If the defendant makes the requisite showing, he is 
entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing to adjudicate his 
double jeopardy claim.” United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1261, 
1267, 1273 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The defendant need only be able 
to identify alleged facts and other evidence which, if credited, 
gives reason to believe that any alleged conspiratorial activity 
was in furtherance of a single conspiracy.”). “The ultimate 
purpose of the totality of the circumstances inquiry is to 
determine whether two groups of conspirators alleged by the 
government to have entered separate agreements are actually 
all committed to the same set of objectives in a single 
conspiracy.” Id. at 1271 (emphasis added). Moreover, “[a] 
non-frivolous showing of a single conspiracy will be made 
26 
 
when the record reveals a degree of participant overlap, 
which together with other factors, permits an inference that 
members of each alleged conspiracy were aware of the 
activities and objectives of the other conspiracy and had some 
interest in the accomplishment of those objectives.” Id. 
 Under Liotard’s “totality of the circumstances” test, 
the threshold is not high, and requires four factors to be 
considered.  
 
[A] conspiracy defendant will make out a non-
frivolous showing of double jeopardy if he can 
show that (a) the “locus criminis” of the two 
alleged conspiracies is the same, (b) there is a 
significant degree of temporal overlap between 
the two conspiracies charged, (c) there is an 
overlap of personnel between the two 
conspiracies (including unindicted as well as 
indicted coconspirators), and (d) the overt acts 
charged and the role played by the defendant 
according to the two indictments are similar.  
 817 F.2d at 1078 (citations omitted) (citing United States v. 
Felton, 753 F.2d 276, 279-81 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 328 (3d Cir. 1977)). These factors need 
not be applied in a rigid manner, as “different conspiracies 
may warrant emphasizing different factors.” Smith, 82 F.3d at 
1267.  
 
  1. Prejudice  
 The District Court denied Travillion’s claim, finding 
Travillion was not prejudiced by counsel failing to move to 
quash the multi-conspiracy indictment. The District Court 
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reasoned instead, “[t]he ultimate question is whether there are 
multiple agreements or only one.” Travillion, 2012 WL 
5354530, at *13 (citing Smith, 82 F.3d at 1267). The District 
Court found without merit Travillion’s argument that the 
conspiracy charges were duplicative and unnecessary because 
both the crack and cocaine conspiracies were charged under 
the same conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, which does not 
include type of drug as an element of the offense. Id. at *14.  
 
 We will now undertake the totality of the 
circumstances test to determine if a nonfrivolous showing 
was made which would have supported a pretrial evidentiary 
hearing. If a showing was made, counsel’s performance may 
be determined to have prejudiced Travillion. 
 
   a. “Locus Criminis” 
 “‘Locus criminis’ is defined very simply as the 
‘locality of a crime; the place where a crime was 
committed.’” Smith, 82 F.3d at 1268 (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 941 (6th ed. 1990)). The Government conceded, 
and we agree, that the locus criminis of the Western District 
of Pennsylvania or the greater Pittsburgh area was the same 
for both Counts Nine and Thirteen. (Appellee Br. at 52.) 
  
   b. Temporal Overlap 
 It is clear there was a “significant degree of temporal 
overlap” between the two conspiracies because Counts Nine 
and Thirteen both state the same timeframe of the 
conspiracies as “[f]rom on or about November 20, 2002, and 
continuing thereafter to on or about February 8, 2003.” (App. 
vol. II at 68, 72.) 
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   c. Overlap of Personnel 
 We have outlined the importance of reviewing the 
personnel involved in the two conspiracies in determining 
whether a double jeopardy claim exists: 
 
An overlap in membership is useful to a double 
jeopardy analysis to the extent that it helps 
determine whether the alleged conspirators in 
both indictments were committed to the same 
objectives and consequently were members of a 
single conspiracy. . . . [I]n evaluating the degree 
of overlap-in-participants factor in a particular 
case, one must look to the circumstances of 
both the common participants and the 
participants apparently connected with only one 
of the alleged conspiracies.  
Smith, 82 F.3d at 1269. Determination of an overlap of 
personnel can help decide the relevant objectives of each 
conspiracy. Id. at 1270; see also Becker, 892 F.2d at 268 
(noting a conspiracy to grow and distribute marijuana and one 
to smuggle and distribute foreign-grown marijuana with 
overlaps in personnel had “two different objectives” and 
“hence [were] two conspiracies”).  
 
 Travillion avers that while only he and Keeley Sowell 
were named in both Counts, the language in the Indictment 
referring to “persons unknown” encompasses other 
participants, most notably Michael Good. He correctly set 
forth the standard to support a pretrial evidentiary hearing as 
merely a “nonfrivolous” showing of commonality, and argues 
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that enough evidence was available for trial counsel to seek a 
hearing to challenge the indictments. On the commonality of 
participants alone, the District Court agreed with Travillion, 
finding that, although on the face of the Counts evidence of 
the same parties is limited, it was “at least nonfrivolous to 
claim commonality of participants.” 2012 WL 5354530, at 
*15.  
 
 While we agree with the District Court that some 
participants overlapped, we disagree that their knowledge of, 
and objectives for, the selling of crack and cocaine were 
common enough to create a single conspiracy. See Becker, 
892 F.2d at 269. The overlap of participants in the two 
conspiracies, at least as far as Travillion and Seeley, together 
with evidence from witness testimony centering the sale of 
both powdered and crack cocaine around Michael Good, is 
not enough to “permit[] an inference that members of each 
alleged conspiracy were aware of the activities and objectives 
of the other conspiracy and had some interest in the 
accomplishment of those objectives.” Smith, 82 F.3d at 1271.  
 
  To decide whether multiple conspiracies existed, and 
thus if Travillion was prejudiced, we must ask not only 
whether the conspirators involved in Counts Nine and 
Thirteen were the same, but more broadly, under Becker, 
whether they had the same objectives. In Becker, this Circuit, 
under the “totality of the circumstances” test of Liotard, 
determined that a “party can be involved in more than one 
conspiracy at one time.” 892 F.2d at 268.  Further, we must 
look at whether “the two conspiracies did not depend on each 
other for success and [if] they had different ultimate 
objectives.” Id. at 269 (citing United States v. West, 670 F.2d 
675, 681 (7th Cir. 1982)). Finally, “[w]hen the evidence 
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indicates that the activities of the alleged conspiracies are not 
interdependent or mutually supportive and that there are 
major participants in each conspiracy who lack knowledge of, 
or any interest in, the activities of the other, this factor weighs 
heavily in favor of the conclusion that two conspiracies 
exist.” Smith, 82 F.3d at 1269.  
 
 Travillion failed to show many of the overlapping 
participants had knowledge of other dealers involved, or sold 
both drugs alleged here as part of two conspiracies. Had a 
pretrial evidentiary hearing been undertaken upon trial 
counsel’s petition, evidence would have been brought forth 
concerning a stipulation between the parties that some 
participants were solely dealers of cocaine, and others only 
dealt crack, and thus had different objectives.
27
 (See 
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 The stipulation states: 
 
 The United States and defendant Percy 
William Travillion stipulate that Isaiah Sherrell 
. . . would testify that . . . he was involved in 
Michael Good’s crack cocaine distribution 
conspiracy, . . . that Jerome Thompson . . . 
would testify that . . . he was involved in 
Michael Good’s powder cocaine distribution 
conspiracy, . . . that Mark Craighead . . . would 
testify that . . .  he was involved in Michael 
Good’s powder cocaine distribution conspiracy, 
. . . that Sam Frazier . . . would testify that . . . 
he was involved in Michael Good’s powder 
cocaine distribution conspiracy, . . . [and] that 
Coty Youngblood . . . would testify that . . . he 
31 
 
Stipulation, App. vol. V at 801-02.) The relevant part states 
other dealers, such as Isaiah Sherrell, “had no dealings or 
personal interaction in drug trafficking with defendant Percy 
Travillion.” (Id. at 801.) As in Smith, “[e]xcept for [Good], 
the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether 
any [deal] except his own went through. . . . The conspiracies 
therefore were distinct and disconnected, not part of a larger 
scheme . . . . There was no drawing of all together in a single, 
overall, comprehensive plan.” 82 F.3d at 1270 (quoting 
Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558 (1947)).  
 
   d. Similar Overt Acts 
 The District Court described this prong of the totality 
of the circumstances test as “problematic,” because 21 U.S.C. 
§ 846 does not require overt acts. Since there is no 
requirement of an overt act, we hold that this strict approach 
to this prong is too narrow and rigid under the modern 
“totality of the circumstances” test. Smith, 82 F.3d at 1268 
(“Undue emphasis on the alleged overt acts is precisely the 
problem we sought to avoid when we adopted the totality of 
the circumstances approach. That approach requires us to 
look into the full scope of activities described and implied in 
the indictments.”). Thus, we now broaden our analysis and 
decide whether to infer only one conspiracy from the relevant 
activities of those involved. See Felton, 753 F.2d at 280.  
 
                                                                                                     
was  involved in Michael Good’s powder 
cocaine distribution conspiracy . . . . 
 
(App. vol. V at 801-02.)  
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 Applying this broad standard, Travillion argues we can 
infer a single conspiracy to distribute cocaine-based drugs in 
the Pittsburgh area. Other Circuits have found that multiple 
transactions can constitute a single conspiracy. “The unity 
essential to a conspiracy is derived from the assent of its 
members to contribute to a common enterprise. Seemingly 
independent transactions may be revealed as parts of a single 
conspiracy by their place in a pattern of regularized activity 
involving a significant continuity of membership.” United 
States v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 999, 1003 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting 
United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1295, 1303 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
Conversely, the Eighth Circuit held, even if “the statutory 
offenses charged are the same, . . . in context with the other 
factors, this is a minor point, since one can certainly enter two 
conspiracies to commit the same type of crime.” United 
States v. Ledon, 49 F.3d 457, 460 (8th Cir. 1995) (referring to 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846); see also United States v. Kienzle, 
896 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating “[w]hile both 
indictments charge[d] . . . a drug conspiracy violative of the 
same statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, entirely different controlled 
substances are named”). Further, the Sixth Circuit has found 
two conspiracies existed when charged under the same statute 
as those in question here. See United States v. Wheeler, 535 
F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting an indictment charging 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine and a 
second charging a conspiracy to distribute the same and 
additional drugs were, when considering all the factors, 
different enough to constitute two separate conspiracies). 
   
 Importantly, the Supreme Court has held that “a 
defendant may be subject to multiple prosecutions of the 
same conduct if Congress intended to impose multiple 
punishments for that conduct.” United States v. Rigas, 605 
33 
 
F.3d 194, 204 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Albernaz v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981)). While Travillion was 
charged in each under the same conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 846, the underlying offenses for each count are two separate 
statutory provisions. Crack is punished under § 
841(b)(1)(A)(iii), while powder cocaine falls under § 
841(b)(1)(B)(ii). Congress intentionally created separate 
statutory provisions and, more importantly, separate 
punishments. See, e.g., United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 
242 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting the weight ratio differences for 
punishment purposes for crack and cocaine). “It is well 
settled that a single transaction can give rise to distinct 
offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.” Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, n.3 (citing 
Harris v. United States, 359 U.S. 19 (1959)). Most 
importantly, “[t]his is true even though the ‘single 
transaction’ is an agreement or conspiracy.” Id. (citing 
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 
(1946)). The potential punishments for crack and powder 
cocaine differ and it is important to know whether the jury 
convicted the defendant of conspiracy to distribute crack or 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, or both. The use of separate 
conspiracies provides a convenient way of determining this.  
 
 In sum, judging the “totality of the circumstances” by 
the standards set forth in Liotard, Travillion would not have 
met the “nonfrivolous” threshold necessary to support an 
evidentiary hearing on his double jeopardy claim, and thus he 
was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to challenge the 
indictment. While a number of the Liotard factors are met, 
nothing in the evidence presented overcomes the 
discontinuity between the cocaine and crack conspiracies. 
The parties involved, other than Michael Good, did not have a 
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singular agreement or objective, nor did they overlap in all 
respects. Simply put, Travillion “has failed to provide a basis 
for inferring that all conspirators were tied together into one 
conspiracy.” Smith, 82 F.3d at 1268.  
 
 In light of our determination Travillion was not 
prejudiced, we need not address the deficiency prong. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. In addition, we need not reach 
the issue of whether or not a concurrent additional term of 
supervised release and an extra $100 special assessment were 
sufficiently prejudicial to support a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
  For the foregoing reasons, because Travillion failed to 
prove he was prejudiced on either ground due to counsel’s 
alleged ineffectiveness, he has not met his burden. No 
“fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 
miscarriage of justice” has been shown to exist and the result 
of the trial is reliable. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
decision of the District Court denying Travillion’s § 2255 
motion.  
